Lehmann, Magidor and others have investigated the e ects of adding the non-Horn rule of rational monotony to the rules for preferential inference in nonmonotonic reasoning. In particular, they have shown that every inference relation satisfying those rules is generated by some ranked preferential model.
Introduction and Overview
The postulates for preferential inference, as formulated by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor 7] are intended to gather together some properties for inference relations that may be regarded as in principle desirable, even when the inference relations are not monotonic. They are all Horn conditions, that is of the form: if such and such pairs are in the relation, so too is such another pair. Lehmann and Magidor 8] and 9] have also studied the e ects of adding to the preferential postulates a further rule, non-Horn in character, called rational monotony. As usually formulated with a negative premise, it is: if j and not j : , then ^ j . Equivalently, with positive premises but disjunctive conclusion, it is: if j then either ^ j or j : . In the two papers mentioned, it is shown that every inference relation satisfying the preferential rules is determined by some model of a certain kind, also called preferential, and that every inference relation satisfying in addition rational monotony is determined by some ranked preferential model.
It is known that rational monotony implies certain other non-Horn conditions of interest, notably disjunctive rationality, which in turn implies negation rationalitysee for example the brief accounts in Makinson 12] and Lehmann and Magidor 9] , or the more extensive work in Freund 2] and Freund and Lehmann 3] which provide a semantic characterization of inference relations satisfying these two rules. It is natural to ask whether there are any other rules of interest, stronger than or incomparable with rational monotony, but still weaker than plain monotony.
Makinson 12] drew attention to one such rule, called determinacy preservation, showing that it lies between monotony and rational monotony, but without investigating it semantically. Bezzazi and Pino P erez 1] began a semantic investigation of two other rules, rational transitivity and rational contraposition. In this paper we study these and related conditions more systematically, establishing interrelations and providing semantic characterizations.
It turns out, as we shall show, that given the preferential rules, rational transitivity and determinacy preservation are equivalent, and are in turn equivalent to the combined force of rational monotony with rational contraposition, as also to the combined force of rational monotony with another rule that we shall consider. Rational transitivity alias determinacy preservation thus appears to occupy a rather pivotal position in this region. We show that any inference relation satisfying that rule in addition to preferential ones, is determined by a preferential model that is in a certain sense quasi-linear. The proof makes use of Lehmann and Magidor's representation theorem for rational monotony, but also of an important tool of a purely semantic nature. This is the result, implicit in Freund 2] , that every ranked preferential model determines the same inference relation as some ranked preferential model that is collapsed, in the sense of being both injective and such that each state is minimal for some formula.
We also consider certain non-Horn rules that are not implied by monotony, and which for this reason are perhaps intuitively less interesting, but which are nevertheless weaker than the well-known rule of conditional excluded middle of Stalnaker 16] , also called full determinacy in Makinson 12] : if not j then j : . We isolate two such rules of particular formal interest, which we call disjunction fragmentation and conjunction fragmentation. We prove that they are equivalent and then we establish a representation theorem for preferential relations satisfying disjunction fragmentation (conjunction fragmentation), using the same semantic tool as for rational transitivity above.
All of the rules so far mentioned as potential additions to those for preferential inference, are non-Horn. Curiously, Horn rules appear to be less plentiful as potential additions. However in a nal section we identify some such rules, weaker than monotony but not implied by rational monotony, represent some of them semantically, and raise a number of open questions.
We presume some familiaritywith the main lines of at least one of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor 7], Lehmann and Magidor 9], Makinson 12 ].
Background
In this section we recall some basic de nitions and results from Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor 7] and Lehman and Magidor 9] , which will be used in the paper.
We consider formulae of classical propositional calculus built over a set of elementary formulae denoted Var plus two constants > and ? (the formulae true and false respectively). Let L be the set of formulae. If Var is nite we will say that the language L is nite. Let U be the set of valuations (or worlds), i.e. functions v : Var f>; ?g ?! f0; 1g such that v(>) = 1 and v(?) = 0. We use lower case letters of the Greek alphabet to denote formulae, and the letters v; v 1 ; v 2 ; : : : to denote worlds. As usual,` means that is a tautology and v j = means that v satis es where compound formulae are evaluated using the usual truth-functional rules. We consider certain binary relations between formulae. These relations will be called inference relations and will be written j . De nition 2.1 A relation j is said to be preferential i the following rules hold A relation j is said to be rational i it is preferential and the following rule (rational monotony) holds RM j j 6 :
De nition 2.3 A structure M = hS; {; i is said to be a preferential model i for any formula the following property (smoothness) holds 8s 2 mod M ( ) n min M ( ) 9s 0 2 min M ( ) s 0 s A structure M = hS; {; i is said to be a ranked model i it is a preferential model and there exists a strict linear order ( ; <) and a function r : S ?! such that for any s; s 0 2 S, s s 0 i r(s) < r(s 0 ). De nition 2.4 Let ; note that this rule corresponds to the hard half of the deduction theorem for classical`), DR -disjunctive rationality, NR -negation rationality. The term CUT is self-explanatory, but it should be noted that this form of cut, which plays an important role in nonmonotonic logic, is weaker than the forms of cut usually studied in Gentzen-style formulations of classical and intuitionistic logic. The latter imply transitivity of the inference relation; the former does not.
Notation: If n is a natural number, n will denote the set f0; 1; : : :; ng linearly ordered with the natural order <. If A is a set, the cardinality of A will be denoted by jAj. When M = hS; {; i is a preferential model, u 2 S and a formula, if there is no ambiguity we shall write u j = , mod( ) and min( ) instead of {(u) j = , mod M ( ) and min M ( ) respectively. Observation 2.8 It is known that there are preferential models whose inference relation is not generated by any injective one. A simple nite example was given en passant by Krauss, Lehmann and Magidor at the end of section 5.2 of 7]. The language is assumed to have just two elementary sentences p; q. The states are s i (0 i 3) with s 0 < s 2 and s 1 < s 3 , and s 0 j = p^:q, s 1 j = :p^:q, whilst s 2 ; s 3 j = p^q.
Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor leave the veri cation of the example as an exercise; a veri cation is sketched by Schlechta in section 1 of 15]. Because of its relation with the theme of this paper, we give the veri cation in full, using moreover an in nite language so as to make it clear that the example is not an artifact of a limited number of elementary sentences.
Let p j (j 2 J) be all the other elementary sentences and make them behave just like p, i.e. put s i j = p j i s i j = p. Let j the inference relation determined by this preferential model. Then clearly we have the following: (1) (p^q)_:qj :q, whilst (2) (p^q)_(p^:q)j 6 :q (witness s 3 ) and (3) (p^q)_(:p^:q)j 6 :q (witness s 2 ). Moreover (4) p^:p j j ?. We claim that any injective preferential model whose inference relation agrees with this one on (1) and (4), disagrees with it on (2) or (3).
Consider any injective preferential model M = hS; {; <i and suppose that (1) and (4) hold. In the case that p^qj ? clearly we have (p^q)_(p^:q)j :q and also (p^q)_(:p^:q)j :q, so we may suppose without loss of generality that p^qj 6 ?. Then there is a state s 2 S with s j = p^q so s j = (p^q)_:q. By (1) s 6 2 min((p^q)_:q) so there is a t 2 S with t < s and t 2 min((p^q)_:q) so by (1) again t j = :q. Now either t j = p or t j = :p. Consider the latter; the argument for the former is similar. Suppose for reductio that (3) holds, i.e. there is u 2 S with u 2 min((p^q)_(:p^:q)) and u j = q. Then u j = p. Moreover for all j 2 J, we have u j = p j , for otherwise there is i 2 J such that u j = p^:p i so there is u with u 0 u and u 0 2 min(p^:p i ) contradicting (4) . Similarly s j = p j for all j 2 J. Since s; u j = p^q^p j for all j 2 J we have {(s) = {(u) so by injectivity s = u. Thus s 2 min((p^q)_(:p^:q)), contradicting t < s and t j = :p^:q.
3 Some strong non-Horn conditions Rational monotony of course is a restricted form of, and thus implied by, plain monotony (M):
One of our purposes in this paper is to examine some interesting non-Horn conditions, stronger than rational monotony (or in some cases, independent of it) but still weaker than monotony. In other words, we wish to investigate the enclosed area of the following diagram Obviously this rule is a weak form of transitivity. The intuition behind this rule is the following: when the premises of transitivity hold we get the usual conclusion except when its`opposite' holds. Note that this rule is also a weak form of conditional excluded middle.
Rational contraposition (RC), also introduced by Bezzazi and Pino P erez 1], is the rule RC j : j 6 : j :
Obviously this rule is a weak form of contraposition. The intuition behind this rule is the following: when the premise of contraposition holds we get the usual conclusion except when its`opposite' holds. This rule is again a weak form of conditional excluded middle.
Weak This proposition suggests a central role for DP alias RT. We verify the components of the proposition separately. The positive parts are rst proven syntactically, the negative parts are then established semantically. Observation 3.3 P + RT , P + DP Proof ()) Suppose j and ^ j 6 : . We want to show ^ j . By preferentiality, ^ j . Thus we have ^ j , j and ^ j 6 : . So by RT ^ j as desired.
(() Suppose j , j and j 6 : . We want to show j . Now, ^ j 6 : for otherwise since j we would have by cut that j : contrary to supposition. Hence since j we have by DP ^ j , and so since j we have by cut that j as desired.
Observation 3.4 P + RT ) RM. That is, a rational transitive relation is indeed a rational relation.
Proof This is a corollary of observation 3.3 and the fact that P + DP ) RM On the other hand, since j 6 we have by preferential rules that j 6 ^ and so :: j 6 :(: _: ). Also since j 6 : we have by preferentiality that j 6 : _: and so :: j 6 : _: .
Putting these three facts together we see that RC fails. j _: which combined with j gives j . But this again combined with j gives, by CM, ^ j and in this subcase we are also done. Case 2. Suppose ^: j : . Then by RC + , either ^ j or ^ j : . In the former subcase we are done. In the latter subcase by preferential rules we have j ! : which combined with j gives again by preferential rules j : . From this, we conclude as above using CM that ^: j and we are also done.
Given the above positive parts of proposition 3.2, it su ces to show the following negative ones: P + RM 6 ) WD, P + RC 6 ) DR, P + WD 6 ) NR. It is immediate that transitivity (T) of j implies RT. However, the converse does not hold: given that P + RT , P + DP shown above, and the well-known facts (see e.g. 12]) that P + T ) M whilst P + DP 6 ) M, we have P + RT 6 ) T. A direct veri cation can also be made with an appropriate two-state model (see corollary 5.3).
As already remarked, DP, RT, RC and WD are weakened forms not only of monotony but also of Stalnaker's rule of conditional excluded middle which, unlike the principles so far considered, is not implied by monotony but has gured in philosophical discussion of counterfactuals (e.g. 6, 10, 13]). We shall study some other rules in the vicinity of conditional excluded middle in section 7.
Collapsed models
Our goal in section 5 will be to prove a representation theorem for P+RT (equivalently P+DP). As a preliminary, we shall show in this section that every ranked preferential model is equivalent (in the sense of generating the same inference relation) to one that is both injective and parsimonious, in the sense that every one of its states is minimal in at least one formula. This result is indeed implicit in Freund 2] in the more general case of relations satisfying P + DR, but using di erent arguments. Our procedure for transforming a ranked model into one with these characteristics is quite straightforward. We proceed in two steps. First, at each level of the model we identify the states of that level that are labelled with the same valuation. Second, we suppress all states that are not minimal in some formula.
De nition 4.1 A model M = hS; {; i is said to be horizontally injective i for all distinct s; t 2 S, if s 6 t and t 6 s then {(s) 6 = {(t).
Note that for ranked models, being horizontally injective actually means injectivity by levels. 
It is quite simple. It is enough to suppress the states which are not minimals for any formula. Essentially the same trick has been used by Pavlos Peppas 14] in the context of systems-of-spheres models for belief revision. 2) that it is injective and for every formula and state u, u j = C( ) i u 2 min( ).
Property 2 explicitly implies injectivity, and the two properties taken together clearly imply parsimony. Conversely, parsimony and injectivity together imply properties 1 and 2, if we assume that the model is ranked: property 1 is immediate from parsimony recalling that u 2 min( ) immediately implies u j = C( ) in every preferential model, whilst to derive property 2 it su ces to show that whenever u 6 2 min( ) then u 6 j = C( ). Suppose u 6 2 min( ). If u 6 j = then we are done, so suppose that u j = . Then there is v u with v 2 min( ). By parsimony, there exists such that u 2 min( ) and thus by rankedness for any v 0 2 min( ), v 0 j = : . Thus : 2 C( ) and so since u j = we have u 6 j = C( ), establishing property 2.
Evidently, each approach has its advantages, depending in part on the purposes for which is used. Since our approach covers only ranked models and thus rationally monotone inference relations, unless it can be generalized it is useless for Freund's purpose, which is to represent preferential inference relations satisfying DR. On the other hand, it provides a simple and natural way of proving representation theorems for conditions such as rational transitivity that are stronger than rational monotony (e.g. theorems 5.8, 7.18 and 8.6 below) and a very direct argument for results of independent model-theoretic interest such as lemma 4.2, proposition 4.4, theorem 4.6 and its corollary 4.7.
Representation
The goal of this section is to characterize the ranked models that generate rational transitive relations. Our argument exploits corollary 4.7
De nition 5.1 A preferential model (not necessarily injective) M = hS; {; i is said to be quasi-linear i it is ranked and it has at most one state at any level above the lowest. In other words quasi-linear means ranked and whenever r s, r t then either s = t or s t or t s.
Quasi-linear models have the following graphical shape:
. . . Proof M is ranked so j is a rational relation. We have to prove that j satis es RT. So, suppose j , j and j 6 : . We want to show j . We consider two cases. First, suppose that min( ) is contained in the lowest level. As also j , necessarily min( ) min( ). But min( ) mod( ) because j . Therefore, min( ) mod( ), i.e. j . Proof Consider a language L built on the propositional variables p, q and r. De ne M = hS; {; i where S = fs 0 ; s 1 g, s 0 s 1 {(s 0 ) = fq; rg, {(s 1 ) = fp; qg. By proposition 5.2 the relation j = j M is a rational transitive relation. But we can easily verify, pj q, qj r and pj 6 r. So j is not a transitive relation. Observation 5.4 Suppose that the language is nite and M = hS; {; i is an injective ranked model which is not quasi-linear. Then j = j M does not satisfy RT and s 3 in S such that s 1 is in the lowest level, s 2 and s 3 are in the same level and s 1 s i for i = 2; 3. We need to nd formulae ; ; with j , j , j 6 : , j 6 . By parsimony there are formulae i (i = 1; 2; 3) with s i 2 min( i ) and by injectivity there are formulae ij (i; j = 1; 2; 3 and i 6 = j) with s i 2 mod( ij ) and s j 6 2 mod( ij ).
Put = 2 _ 3 , = ( 2 _ 3 )_( 1^ 12 ) and = ( 1^ 12 )_( 3^ 32 ). Then it is clear
that ` so j ; and using rankedness min( ) mod( 1^ 12 ) so j ; whilst again using rankedness s 2 2 min( ) but s 2 6 2 mod( ) so j 6 and nally s 3 It is easy to show the following corollary of point 3 of this lemma:
Lemma 6.3 Let j be a rational relation de ned by a preferential ranked model M = hS; {; i with r : S ?! the ranking function ( linearly ordered by ). For any formula de ne its level,`( ), as 1 if j ? and otherwise its level is the unique a 2 such that there exists s 2 min M ( ) with r(s) = a. Then, the level is well de ned and < i `( ) `( ).
We remark that the relation < of 9] (de nition A3, rst de ned in 8]) is equivalent to that of de nition 6.1 in the case of rational inference relations; the idea behind these`orders' has roots in Lewis 10] . In 2] Freund called preferential order any relation < on formulae satisfying the following four properties: P 0 : < ? P 1 : If ` , then (a) < ) < (b) < ) < P 2 : < and < implies < _ P 3 : _ < implies < Freund proves that the`order' associated with a preferential inference relation by de nition 6.1 satis es these properties. Conversely the inference relation j associated with a relation < satisfying these properties by putting j i < ^: is a preferential inference relation; moreover the order associated with this inference relation by de nition 6.1 coincides with <. Thus < satis es properties P 0 -P 3 i it is the preferential order associated with some preferential inference relation in the sense of de nition 6.1. We recall the de nition of modular relation (see 9]):
De nition 6.4 A relation < on E is said to be modular i there exists a linear order on some set and a function r : E ?! such that a < b , r(a) r(b).
The following characterization of modularity is well-known and easy to verify.
Lemma 6.5 An order < on E is modular i for any a; b; c 2 E if a and b are incomparables and a < c then b < c.
The following proposition is due to Freund (personal communication).
Proposition 6.6 j is a rational relation i the preferential order between formulae associated by de nition 6.1 with j is modular over the set of j -consistent formulae, i.e. those formulae with j 6 ?. Proof The only if part follows from the representation theorem 2.6 and lemma 6.3. More precisely, by the representation theorem 2.6 there exists a ranked model M = hS; {; i with r : S ?! the ranking function ( linearly ordered by ) such that j = j M . De ne the function`mapping a formula to its level`( ). This mapping and lemma 6.3 prove that < is modular. Conversely, suppose that the preferential order between formulae < is modular.
Assume j and j 6 : . We want to show that ^ j . By part 2 of lemma 6.2, this last expression is equivalent to ^ < ^ ^: and the assumptions are equivalent to < ^: and 6 < ^ . Note that either ^ < or ^ 6 < . In the rst case we use Freund's property P 1 (b) to obtain ^ < ^ ^: . In the second case, and ^ are incomparables because 6 < ^ using part 2 of lemma 6.2 again. So by modularity, ^ < ^: because < ^: . Now, as before using the property P 1 (b), we obtain ^ < ^ ^: .
The following lemma will be useful:
Lemma 6.7 Let j a preferential relation and < its associated preferential order. For any formulae and if < then > < Proof Note that `>. Suppose < . Then by P 1 (a) we have > < .
The quasi-linear property, QLP in short, for an order < associated to an inference relation j is the following property: for any formulae and , if > < then either < or < or is j -equivalent to , i.e. j and j . Proposition 6.8 Let Hence the preferential order < does not satisfy QLP.
Note that the argument in this proof \translates" the one of proposition 5.6. Now we prove the if part. Suppose that j is a preferential relation which satis es QLP. We want to show that j satis es RT. By theorem 5.8, it will be enough to see that j is represented by a quasi-linear model. In order to do that, we rst show that < is modular. Suppose that 6 < , 6 < , and < . We want to show that < . By lemma 6.7, > < . So, by QLP, < or < or and are j -equivalent. But we shall see that the last two cases lead to a contradiction. Case 1: Suppose that < . Then by transitivity of < we have < , a contradiction. Case 2: Suppose that and are j -equivalent. Then, in any model M representing j we have min M ( ) = min M ( ). So by the lemma 6.2 using < we conclude that < . We nd again a contradiction.
Therefore the only possibility is < as desired. As < is modular, by the proposition 6.6, the relation j is rational. So there is a ranked model M representing it, and by theorem 4. 6 j is generated by its associated standard model (cf. remark 4.9) which is ranked.
Moreover, this canonical model is quasi-linear: suppose the canonical model is not quasi-linear, i.e. there are two di erent worlds, m and n, both in a non-minimal level. We want to show that the condition QLP does not hold. By standardness (the canonical model is standard), there are formulae , (not necessarily di erent) such that m j = C( ), n j = C( ), m 2 min( ) and n 2 min( ). But, m 6 = n implies that there is a formula such that m j = and n j = : . Put 1 = ^ and 1 = ^: . It is clear that m 2 min( 1 ) and n 2 min( 1 ), so the minimal elements of 1 and 1 are at the same level. Therefore 1 6 < 1 and 1 6 < 1 . But it is also clear that m 6 2 min( 1 ) so 1 and 1 are not j -equivalent. Thus to see that the property QLP does not hold for 1 and 1 it is enough to observe that > < 1 because the minimal elements of are in a level above the lowest one.
7 Some Non-Horn rules incomparable with monotony
We consider some non-Horn rules that are stronger than rational monotony, but are not implied by monotony and for this reason are perhaps less interesting than those we have considered so far. We show how they may be characterized by certain subclasses of quasi-linear models.
De nition 7.1 A preferential relation j is said to be completely determinated i the following rule holds CEM j 6 j : In other words for any and , j or j : . This rule is called conditional excluded middle in Stalnaker 16] and also called full determinacy in Makinson 12 2. This is well known. Take, for instance, j to be the classical consequence relation.
This relation obviously satis es P and M but does not satisfy CEM. 3 . Also well known. To recall: take the preferential structure with just two states, one less than the other. Every model on this structure satis es P and CEM, whilst an appropriate model on it (e.g. the one used in the proof of corollary 5.3) fails to satisfy M.
De nition 7.3 A preferential model (not necessarily injective) M = hS; {; i is said to be linear i it is ranked and has at most one state at each level, i.e. i it is of the shape:
. . .
#
The following theorem can be extracted from work of Stalnaker and Lewis on the logic of counterfactual conditionals, but we give a direct veri cation here. Theorem 7.4 A preferential inference relation j is completely determinated i there exists a linear model M such that j M = j . Proof The if part is evident. We prove the only if part. Suppose that j is completely determinated. Then by remark 7.2 and proposition 3.2, j satis es RM. By the Lehmann-Magidor representation theorem 2.6, j can be represented by a ranked preferential model, which by theorem 4.6 we may suppose collapsed. To show that the model is linear, it su ces to show that there are no two distinct states on the same level. Suppose for reductio that s, t are on the same level and s 6 = t. By parsimony there are formulae , with s 2 min( ) and t 2 min( ). By injectivity there is an elementary formula p with s 2 mod(p) and t 6 2 mod(p). Then clearly, using rankedness of the model, we have fs; tg min( _ ), so _ j 6 p and _ j 6 :p, contrary to complete determination.
De nition 7.5 A preferential model is said to be almost linear i it is ranked and has at most one state at any rank above the lowest and at most two states at the lowest level. In other words, i it is quasi-linear and has at most two states in the lowest level.
One may wonder whether these models satisfy any interesting new rules. And if so, whether we can characterize those rules by almost linear models. Both answers are positive, as we shall now show. We consider the following two rules 1 and s 2 are on the same level and are distinct (for using j _ we have s 1 2 mod( )), and so, by quasi-linearity, they are on the lowest level. Since s 1 2 mod(: ), necessarily min(: ) is included in the lowest level. So s 3 is also on the lowest level.
Since j _ we have also s 2 2 mod( ) and s 3 Using injectivity, there are formulae 1 , 2 , 3 such that i 2 mod(s j ) i i = j (for i; j = 1; 2; 3). Now trivially 1 _ 2` 1 _ 2 so 1 _ 2 j 1 _ 2 . But 1 _ 2 j 6 1 (witness s 2 ) and 1 _ 2 j 6 2 (witness s 1 ), and : 1 j 6 2 (witness s 3 ), so that FD fails.
We now compare the strength of the rules FD and FC with those implied by monotony that were studied in section 3. Theorem 7.13 Given P we have CEM ) FC, FD ) DP, but neither converse holds.
Before proving the theorem, we combine the information that it contains with corollary 7.9, remark 7.11, and proposition 3. As before, we verify the positive parts of the theorem syntactically and the negative parts semantically. We begin with the positive parts Proposition 7.14 P + CEM ) FC Proof Suppose ^ j but j 6 and j 6 ; we want to show j : . Suppose for reductio that j 6 : . Then by CEM, j and so by the rst premise using CUT, j contradicting the second premise.
Note that we also have an easy semantical proof of this proposition using theorem 7.4 and proposition 7.10. We suspect that there are not`very many' Horn rules which, like CI, are implied by preferential rules with monotony but are not implied by the preferential rules alone. There are some, however, of technical more than conceptual interest. Consider the in nite series of rules of n-monotony (n 1), n-M in short, constructed as follows:
and in general n-M 1 j 1 ( ) : : : 1^: : :^ n j n ( ) 1^: : :^ n^ n+1 j n ( ) where each i ( ) is either or : according as i is odd or even, and noting that the conclusion-rule uses n rather than n+1 . This rule is evidently reminiscent of the alternating sequence of statements in the party example in section 1.2 of Lewis 10] :`If Otto had come, it would have been a lively party; but if both Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a dreary party; but if Waldo had come as well, it would have been lively; but ...' Of course, that is an in nite list of conditional expressions, and not a list of Horn rules about them. The rule number n is a scheme, one of whose instances in e ect takes the rst n Lewis statements as its n premises, and puts as conclusion a statement that is like Lewis' statement n + 1 but with opposite consequent.
Clearly, 1-M is plain monotony. Moreover we have the following: Observation 8.2 1. For all n, P + n-M implies (n + 1)-M.
2. It is easy to see that (a) any ranked model with at most n levels satis es n-M, (b) there is a linear preferential model with n + 1 levels that fails n-M. These two facts give the desired result, using theorem 7.4.
3. Let j be a preferential relation that fails 2-M; we want to show that it fails CI. Since it fails 2-M, there are formulae 1 4. To prove this part, it su ces by proposition 7.10 and 2(a) above, to nd an almost linear model with two levels that fails CI. Clearly the following model will do: the language is built over the elementary formulae p; q; r; the lowest level has two states s 1 ; s 2 with {(s 1 ) = fp; rg, {(s 2 ) = fq; rg, whilst the next level has one state only s 3 with {(s 3 ) = fp; qg, so pj r, qj r, p^qj 6 r.
We note that since by proposition 8.1, P + CI 6 ) NRjWD, points 1 and 3 above tells us that P + n-M 6 ) NRjWD, whenever n > 1.
We may thus extend our diagram as follows: where each i ( ) is or : according as i is odd or even. From (n + 1) there is a state s n+1 with s n+1 2 min( 1^: : :^ n+1 ) but {(s n+1 ) 6 j = n ( ). But by (n), s n+1 6 2 min( 1^: : :^ n ), so there is s n s n+1 with s n 2 min( 1^: : :^ n ) and {(s n ) j = n ( ). Continuing down like this we get a sequence s n+1 s n s 1 of length n + 1 of states of the model, so that its height is n + 1. . . . 1^: : :^ n j n ( ) 1^: : :^ n^ n+1 j n+1 ( ) From this it is evident that to show that n-M fails it is enough to see that 1^: : :^ n^ n+1 j 6 n ( ). From points 2 and 3, 1^: : :^ n^ n+1 is j -consistent and since 1^: : :^ n^ n+1 j n+1 ( ), necessarily 1^: : :^ n^ n+1 j 6 n ( ), as desired. Theorem 8.6 Let j be any preferential inference relation. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
